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1 Introduction
The deep integration of developing countries into
the global economy has many advantages and pos-
itive effects. In particular, capital flows to develop-
ing countries have clear and important benefits.
These are especially clear for foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), which is not only more stable, but also
brings technological know-how and access to mar-
kets. External flows can also lower the cost of cap-
ital and complement domestic savings, although
this is less important where domestic savings are
already high.
However, large surges of short-term and potentially
reversible capital flows to developing countries can
have very negative effects. Firstly, these surges pose
complex policy dilemmas for macroeconomic man-
agement, as they can initially push key macroeco-
nomic variables, such as exchange rates and prices
of assets like property and shares, away from what
could be considered their long-term equilibrium.
Secondly, they pose the risk of very sharp reversals,
which - particularly if they lead to currency and
financial crises - can result in very serious losses of
output, investment and employment, as well as
increases in poverty
In the case of the Asian crisis, the reversal of private
capital flows has been dramatic. According to fig-
ures from the Institute of International Finance, the
five East Asian countries hardest hit by the crisis
(South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and
the Philippines) experienced a turnaround of
US$105 billion in a single year, reaching more than
10 per cent of the combined GDP of these
economies; the shift was from an inflow of capital
of + US$93 billion in 1996 to an estimated outflow
of US$12 billion in 1997 (see Table 1). Most of this
dramatic swing originated from commercial bank
lending (which fell by US$76.8 billion), whilst FDI
remained constant.
This massive and sudden withdrawal of capital
flows in itself caused a dramatic reduction in
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Table 1: Five Asian economies' external financing (US$ billion)
absorption, as well as currency crises. In Asia,
violent devaluation and large increases in interest
rates implied that the currency crises interacted
with banking crises, which led to contraction of
bank lending. Often, in developing countries (with
Mexico in 1994-95 providing another good exam-
ple), currency crises spill over into domestic finan-
cial crises and vice-versa, whereas this does not
happen very often in developed countries (Akyuz
1998).
The combination of the reversal of capital flows,
currency and domestic financial crises in East Asia
led to a very severe economic crisis in countries that
had been growing extremely rapidly for a very long
period.
Within present arrangements, the volatility and
reversibility of some categories of capital flows and
their very negative effects implies that the costs of
these flows to countries' development are seen as
higher than their benefits, at least during important
periods of time. As a consequence, there is growing
consensus that important changes need to be made
in the international monetary system as a whole -
and in recipient country policies - to avoid costly
crises, as well as to manage them better if they do
occur. Important economic authorities like Alan
Greenspan, Chairman of the US Federal Reserve,
(Financial Times, 28 February 1998) and Joseph
Stiglitz, Chief Economist of the World Bank (Stiglitz
1998a and b) as well as several important analysts,
have called for such changes.
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Source: Institute of International Finance 'Capital flows to emerging economies', 29 January
1998, Washington D.C.
It seems urgent to:
identify the possible changes required to achieve
this result
evaluate the potential economic effects of such
changes
define institutional developments that would be
required to implement those changes.
This article attempts to contribute elements to the
on-going important debate on this issue. Section 2
will explore further the causes of the East Asian cri-
sis, focussing on those more relevant to the central
issues of this article. Section 3 examines measures for
crisis prevention. More emphasis will be placed on
international measures, like better surveillance by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and better regu-
lation of capital by source countries and internation-
ally; however, some of the market-based policies that
may need to be taken by recipient countries to dis-
courage excessive surges of short-term capital flows
are also evaluated. Section 4 examines the measures
to better manage international crises if they do occur,
including the expanded role of the IMF as a lender of
last resort and better debt workout mechanisms.
Section 5 concludes and summarises.
2 Causes of the Asian Crisis
A large literature is emerging emphasising from dif-
ferent perspectives the domestic causes of the Asian
crisis. lt is beyond the scope of this paper to exam-




Externat financing, net 92.8 15.2 77.6
Private flows, net 93,0 12.1 105.1
Equity investment 19.1 4.5 23.6
Direct equity 7.0 7.2 +0.2
Portfolio equity 12.1 11.6 23.7
Private creditors 74.0 7.6 81.6
Commercial banks 55.5 21.3 76.8
Non-bank private creditors 18.4 13.7 4.7
Official flows, net 0.2 27.2 +27.4
stressing (Stiglitz 1997). First, the current account
deficits in East Asia reflected private sector deficits.
Second, the Asian crisis was a consequence of over-
investment (some or much of it misallocated) and
not of overconsumption. Third, the most important
cause of the crisis was a sharp deterioration in con-
fidence, not of macroeconomic fundamentals,
which were mostly extremely strong.
What seems most disturbing about the Asian crisis
is that it happened to countries that had been so
successful for a long period, not just in terms of
economic growth but also in terms of great
dynamism in their exports, low rates of inflation,
high rates of savings and rather equitable distribu-
tion. Even though several of these countries had
high current account deficits, this had been seen as
acceptable for quite a long time both by analysts
and markets, for two reasons; first, these deficits
were financing very high investment rates; second,
the current account deficits did not originate in fis-
cal deficits - on the contrary, the Asian economies
had fiscal surpluses - but were caused by private
sector deficits.
So what went wrong? Clearly there were problems
in the Asian economies, including serious weak-
nesses in their domestic financial systems and in
their governance (see below). However, there is
another causal factor, which relates more to the
international dimension, and in particular to the
behaviour of international capital flows. This expla-
nation is based on certain imperfections of interna-
tional capital markets that have always been there,
but whose impact has increased due to technologi-
cal developments, which allow the wheels of
international finance to turn far faster than before.
The negative effects of highly mobile capital can,
paradoxically, be strongest for economies that either
are - or are perceived as about to become - highly
successful. We could call it the curse of the success-
ful economy; more technically, we could call it
'financial Dutch disease'. A successful economy
offers high yields and profits to international
investors. If these investors can find ways to enter
these economies, or if their entrance is facilitated by
capital account liberalisation, they will rush in. This
surge of capital inflows will affect key macroeco-
nomic variables. Exchange rates tend to become
greatly overvalued; the prices of key assets, like
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shares and land, tend to rise significantly and
quickly As a result there is both an increase in real
income (as imported goods become cheaper) and
an increase in perceived wealth (as asset prices
become at least temporarily higher), as well as a
perceived increase in future income. Banks can
increase lending, lifting liquidity constraints. As a
result of these factors, individuals consume more;
also private companies increase their investment.
The sum of these individual decisions has macro-
economic implications. The current account of the
balance of payments deteriorates, often quite
rapidly, as both consumption and investment rise.
Initially, this is not seen as a problem, as foreign
lenders and investors are happy to continue lend-
ing/investing, given high profitability combined
with the perception of low risk, as they are going
into what is broadly seen as a successful economy
Then, something changes. The change may be
domestic or international. It may be economic or
political. It may be an important change or a rela-
tively small one. The key element is that this change
triggers a sharp modification in perceptions, leading
to a large fall in confidence in the economy among
internationally mobile investors; these can be both
foreign investors in the country or nationals able
and willing to take their liquid assets out of the
country
The change of perceptions tends to be both large
and quick. A country that was perceived as a suc-
cessful economy or a successful reformer - for
which no amount of praise was sufficient - sud-
denly is seen as fragile, risky and crisis prone. The
change of perception tends to be far larger than the
magnitude of the underlying change warrants. The
frightening aspect is that there is a very strong ele-
ment of self-fulfilling prophecy in the change of
perception. Currency crises happen to a significant
extent because lenders and investors fear they can
happen. The fact that they first stop lending and
investing and then pull out contributes greatly to
make their worst nightmares come true. As a result,
there can be much overshooting. Exchange rates
can collapse, as can stock markets and property
prices. Governments or central banks are forced to
raise interest rates to defend the currency As a
result, banking systems become far more fragile
than they were before, as previous weaknesses are
magnified and new ones emerge.
An additional problem is contagion. Countries in
the same region, or with weaknesses seen to be sim-
ilar as the crisis country can also suffer from a par-
allel change of perception by investors. The crisis
spreads to other countries, including to those with
basically good economic fundamentals. The latter
may suffer somewhat less, but may, if unlucky, be
caught up in the whirlwind of deteriorating percep-
tions.
This pattern helps explain the currency and
banking crises in the Southern Cone of Latin
America in the early 1980s; it helps explain the
Mexican peso crisis and the Tequila effect. It also
provides important elements to understanding the
1997 Asian crises. Of course there are significant
differences between these crises, and the previous
ones throughout the centuries (Kindleberger 1996).
But the boombust behaviour of short-term lenders
and investors, driven not just by real trends (which
they help shape), but by dramatic changes in per-
ceptions is a common denominator to these
different crises.
Capital and financial markets are special in that -.
though generally functioning well - they are prone
to important imperfections. Factors like asymmetric
information and adverse selection play an impor-
tant role in explaining these imperfections, given
that financial markets are particularly information
intensive (Stiglitz 1994). Furthermore, as Keynes
(1936) showed with his well-known metaphor of
the beauty contest, there are strong incentives to
follow the herd in financial markets, as each mdi-
vidul short-term investor, lender or fund manager
tries to choose the investment or loan that he/she
thinks likeliest to be chosen by other investors or
lenders, as his colleagues' assessment will be a cru-
cïal determinant of short-term prices.
Also of relevance for understanding the Asian crisis
is the concept of self-fulfilling attacks, that is crises
arising without obvious current policy inconsisten-
cies, see Obstfeld (1995) and Griffith-Jones (1998).
In this model, speculative attacks are basically
caused, not by bad fundamentals, but by future
expected shifts of macroeconomic policies, which
will be caused by the attack itself. In these models,
the attitude of speculators and investors is crucial to
whether an attack occurs. This implies multiple
equilibria for exchange rates. The existence of self-
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fulfilling attacks and multiple equilibria implies that
good macroeconomic fundamentals are a very
important necessary but not sufficient condition for
avoiding currency crises.
As Wyplocz (1998) rightly argues, there is at
present limited understanding of what triggers self-
fulfilling attacks. As a consequence, self-fulfilling
attacks are fundamentally unpredictable. It is inter-
esting that the main explanations given by market
actors for different recent crises (e.g. Mexican peso
crisis, crises in different Asian countries) tend to be
rather different ones. As a result, developing coun-
tries' policymakers face the daunting task of 'play-
ing to moving goal-posts', to avoid crises. Naturally
there are conditions of vulnerability that can be
identified (such as the ratio of short-term foreign
exchange debts plus the stock of assets that can eas-
ily leave the country divided by the level of foreign
exchange reserves, or high current account
deficits). But such vulnerability indicators do not
imply that a crisis will occur. Many countries have
such high vulnerability indicators but do not have a
crisis. On the other hand, some of these indicators
may be relatively low and/or improving (e.g. the
current account deficit was relatively low and
improving in South Korea in 1997) and the country
can still have a crisis.
Domestic policies - at the macroeconomic level, to
the domestic financial sector, and the possible reg-
ulation of short-term capital inflows - can of course
play an important role. However, they are difficult
to implement perfectly As a consequence, an
international effort is also required to make costly
currency crises in developing and transition coun-
tries less likely and to manage them better if they do
occur.
In the nineteenth century the rapid development of
private banking implied frequent national banking
crises. The establishment and development of
national regulatory bodies and of Central Banks
with lender of last resort facilities made such crises
less frequent (Griffith-Jones and Lipton 1987).
Similarly the rapid development of global capital
and banking flows in the latter part of the twentieth
century implies the need for new measures of global
governance to regulate those flows. These will
include better regulation of international credit and
portfolio flows, as well as improvements of the
lender of last resort facility and possible
development of international debt workout proce-
dures. We now turn to these options.
3 Crisis Prevention
Issues explored by the G-22
A number of proposals which aim to prevent crises
are currently being discussed in the international
community In response to the Asian crisis the G-
22, which comprises the G-7 countries and a range
of emerging and developing economies, was estab-
lished with working groups looking at three impor-
tant areas: (i) Enhancing Transparency and
Disclosure of Information; (ii) Strengthening
Financial Systems, in National Economies and
Globally; (iii) Appropriate Burden-Sharing in
International Financial Crises. This section will
focus on the first two areas, while the third will be
discussed in the section on crisis management.
Enhancing transparency and disclosure of
information
The Asian crisis has provoked calls for
improvements to information disclosure, data dis-
semination and international surveillance. Financial
markets, as well as policymakers, need timely
access to reliable and comprehensive information.
However, it is equally important that the informa-
tion which is available is used effectively Again, the
Asian crisis shows that markets and ratings agencies
were initially slow to respond to certain danger sig-
nais in Asian economies and then over-reacted once
the crisis broke.
First, it is important to establish what types of
information would promote more efficient and sta-
ble financial markets. In the Asian crisis, some of
the significant data gaps and deficiencies were:
information on foreign exchange reserves, includ-
ing undisclosed forward positions; the maturity and
currency exposures of the public and private sec-
tors; and the health of the financial system, includ-
ing information on non-performing loans. The
question of accurate information is made even more
complex due to the growing use of off-balance sheet
transactions such as forward contracts and other
financial derivatives.
Second, it is important to establish how information
could best be generated. Attempts to implement
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greater transparency after the Mexican peso crisis
revealed the difficulties involved. In order to
encourage transparency in emerging market
economies, it was proposed at the 1998 Spring
meeting of the IMF and the World Bank that the
Fund could delay the completion of its annual
Article IV health check of a country's economy, if it
were not satisfied with the information being dis-
closed. The IMF was also asked to encourage more
emerging market economies to make public the
results of these consultations with the Fund
through the issuance of Press Information Notices
(PINS) on the IMF website.
Thirdly, there is the question of how increased
transparency can improve the effectiveness of IMF
surveillance, and how multilateral institutions
themselves could become more accountable. In the
aftermath of the peso crisis the Fund established the
Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) and
the Dissemination Standard Bulletin Board (DSBB)
on the IMF website. The IMF is currently looking
at ways in which the SDDS could be broadened and
strengthened. The Asian crisis has led to requests
that the IMF be obliged to inform the markets when
it thinks a country is heading for a crisis. The dan-
gers of 'whistle blowing' are clear: it could turn the
Fund into a rating agency and seriously compro-
mise its position as confidential advisor to member
countries, and a public warning may provoke the
very crisis that it is trying to prevent. However, the
IMPs Interim Committee proposed developing a
'tiered response' whereby the Fund would give
increasingly strong, and ultimately public, warnings
to countries which it believed were heading for
trouble.
Fourth, there is the question of how to promote the
best use of available information by banks and
other market participants in evaluating risks and
making decisions. There is concern that even if
information and transparency were greatly
improved, it would not necessarily lead to better
investment decisions, nor to the removal of the
threat of market over-reactions. Moreover, while the
focus of the current call for improved transparency
and surveillance is at the recipient country level, it
is clear that there is also a need for better surveil-
lance of the market. Greater attention needs to be
given to the risks posed by potential large reversals
of capital flows, particularly the role of currency
traders and hedge funds in influencing currency
and asset price movements.
Strengthening financial systems, in national
economies and globally
The Asian crisis has highlighted the importance of
strong financial systems in maintaining the stability
of national economies, and international currency
and capital markets. The G-22 working group is
looking at ways to strengthen financial systems both
domestically and globally The G-22 will build on
work already undertaken in the international com-
munity - for example, in fostering coherent interna-
tional supervisory and regulatory arrangements,
and in identifying an appropriate strategy for pro-
moting financial stability in emerging market
economies,1
The key areas being considered by the G-22 are: (i)
the implementation of effective banking and securi-
ties regulatory and supervisory arrangements and
the issue of financial sector surveillance; (ii) the
development of institutional infrastructure needed
for the efficient and stable operation of financial
markets; (iii) the promotion of effective market dis-
cipline, including managerial responsibility and
good corporate governance; and (iv) the promotion
of capital account liberalisation, including appro-
priate sequencing and the amendment of the IMF
Articles following the Interim Committee
declaration in 1997.
First, there is the adoption of effective banking and
securities regulatory and supervisory arrangements;
the Basle 'Core Principles' (see Valpy FitzGerald,
Global Capital Market Volatility and the Developing
Countries: Lessons from the East Asian Crisis, in
this bulletin) for the banking sector and the norms
of bodies such as the International Organisation of
Securities' Regulators (IOSCO) for securities.
However, establishing sound regulatory and super-
visory systems in all IMF member countries will be
a lengthy and complex process. The well publicised
failures in the financial systems of the advanced
economies illustrate this; and, as Stiglitz (1998b)
has noted, it is important to recognise that develop-
ing countries have less capacity for financial
regulation and greater vulnerability to shocks.
See the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
'Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision,
developed by a working group consisting of
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There is also the question of the effective
surveillance of the financial sector. The role of the
IMF in the surveillance of domestic financial systems
has come under scrutiny recently It was proposed at
the G-7 meeting in Canada that an independent
international agency or a joint surveillance unit of the
IMF and the World Bank (with the Bank of
International Settlements (BIS) involvement) be
established. Such a body would be responsible for
designing financial sector reform strategies in crisis
situations and for carrying out surveillance of
national financial regimes in non-crisis countries. At
the same time, efforts to build up surveillance disci-
pline through greater cooperation among regional
central banks and the application of 'peer pressure'
at the regional level should also be considered.
Second, the G-22 working group is looking at the
development of an appropriate institutional infra-
structure needed for the operation of financial mar-
kets. Issues such as the development of deeper
domestic financial markets, the design of deposit
insurance arrangements, and the strengthening of
payment and settlement systems will be examined.
Third, the working group will review the promotion
of effective market discipline and good governance.
This includes mechanisms designed to foster arms
length relations and a sound credit culture such as
strictures on connected lending, and penalties for
insider dealing and certain cross-holdings between
financial and non-financial institutions.
Fourth, there is the issue of the promotion of
capital account liberalisation. The G-22 will look at
the question of the appropriate sequencing and the
amendment of the IMF Articles. On the sequencing
of capital account liberalisation, a number of mini-
mum pre-conditions have been outlined including:
a sound macroeconomic policy framework; reforms
to the financial system; that the opening of the cap-
ital account should be phased to take account of the
countrys macroeconomic situation and the state of
domestic reforms; and timely and accurate informa-
tion disclosure. However, more work is needed on
this issue. The Asian crisis has highlighted the prob-
lems that can result when fragile emerging market
economies open their capital accounts. As noted
above, a sudden change in market perceptions can
representatives of the BasIc Committee and emerging
market countries.
have deeply damaging effects on countries which
have seen little change in their economic funda-
mentals. It is important that countries should be
able to use market based measures, such as the
Chilean reserve requirements (see below), to man-
age capital inflows.
The proposals examined above would all contribute
to strengthening the international financial system.
Shaping an effective crisis prevention strategy, how-
ever, will require sharper tools.
Regulating and/or taxing capital inflows
National measures
This section will focus more on suggestions for
international measures to discourage excessive
surges of short-term capital and debt flows.
However, we will start by examining measures that
recipient countries can take to discourage such
surges. Indeed, some countries (e.g. Chile and
Colombia) have implemented measures (such as
taxes and non-remunerated reserve requirements
on flows during a fixed period) to discourage exces-
sive surges of short-term capital flows. Their aim
has been threefold:
(1)To change the structure of capital inflows in
order to increase the share of FDI and long-term
loans within total capital flows, and above all to
decrease the share of short-term and potentially
reversible flows, by discouraging the latter. The
lower level of short-term flows makes the coun-
try less vulnerable to currency crises.
(2)To increase the autonomy of domestic monetary
policy, as measures such as non-remunerated
reserve requirements allow the recipient country
to maintain higher national interest rates than
the ïnternational ones; this is useful for control-
ling inflation and curbing excessive growth of
aggregate demand - without attracting excessive
capital inflows.
(3)To curb large overvaluation of the exchange rate,
caused by a surge, which discourages growth of
exports and poses the risk of growing and
unsustainable current account deficits.
Several studies in the mid-1990s (Ffrench-Davis
and Griffith-Jones 1995; Khan and Rheinhart 1995)
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showed how measures to discourage inflows have
been a contributory factor to a relatively more
successful management of capital inflows.
Furthermore, these measures are widely seen as one
of several reasons (with prudent macroeconomic
management being perhaps the main one) why
Chile and Colombia were amongst the few coun-
tries in Latin America to be relatively unaffected by
the tequila crisis in 1994-1995 and by the
1997-1998 Asian crisis. In the case of Chile, there
is econometric and other evidence that the disin-
centives to short-term inflows have contributed
fairly significantly to reduce the inflow of short-
term, interest-arbitraging funds, and their propor-
tion of total capital inflows (Agosin 1996;
Budnevich and Le Fort 1997). Chilean policymak-
ers saw as important that, at a time of declining US
interest rates in the early 1990s and a booming
economy in Chile, the Central Bank was able to
increase rather than lower interest rates in order to
maintain macroeconomic equilibrium.2 There is
also evidence that total capital flows to Chile were
lower than they would have otherwise been
(though a clear counterfactual is always difficult)
and that as a consequence the resulting strengthen-
ing of the currency has been less than it would have
been.
Two of the attractive features of the Chilean
measures are: that they are market-based, rather
than quantitative (Fischer 1997), and that they
apply to practically all short-term flows, thus sim-
plifying administrative procedures and reducing
possibilities of evasion, even though some evasion
is naturally inevitable. Colombia has a similar,
though more complex, approach. Its measures are
also broadly seen as successful, particularly in dis-
couraging short-term flows and improving the term
structure of total capital flows. It is interesting that
the IMF (1995), the World Bank (1997) and the BIS
(1995) have explicitly recognised that - though
having some limitations and minor microeconomic
disadvantages - market-based measures taken by
recipient governments to discourage short-term
capital flows do play a positive role, if they are part
of a package of policy measures that include sound
macroeconomic fundamentals as well as a strong
and well-regulated domestic financial system.
Z Personal communication with Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, then Chief Economist at the Central Bank.
This support for recipient countries discouraging
short-term flows has grown since the Asian crisis
(Stiglitz 1998, Wolf 1998, Rodrik 1998, Radelet
and Sachs 1998). It would seem advisable for coun-
tries to implement such a policy during periods of
surges, and for international institutions like the
IMF to encourage countries adopting such mea-
sures, in a temporary way, at times when countries
receive excessive inflows of short-term capital and
when other key conditions, e.g. good macroeco-
nomic fundamentals, are in place.
International measures
The question, however, needs to be asked whether
measures to discourage excessive short-term capital
inflows by recipient countries are enough to deal
with the problem of capital surges and the risk of
their reversal. There seem to be at least three strong
reasons making complementary action by source
countries necessary. First, not all major recipient
countries will be willing to discourage short-term
capital inflows, and some may even encourage
them. A recent example of the latter are the tax and
regulatory measures taken in Thailand to encourage
the Bangkok International Banking Facility, which
de facto encouraged short-term borrowing
(Boorman 1998).
Second, even those recipient countries - like Chile,
Colombia and Malaysia - which have deployed a
battery of measures to discourage short-term capital
inflows have, on occasions, found these measures
insufficient to stem very massive inflows.
Third, if one or several major emerging countries
experience attacks on their currencies, which also
result in difficulties to service their debt in full, it is
far more probable than in the past that those coun-
tries will be forced to seek official funding to allow
them to continue servicing their foreign exchange
obligations in full, rather than being able to restruc-
ture such obligations. As the IMF (1995) pointed
out, one important reason for the latter is the diffi-
culty of restructuring securitised exposures owned
by a diversity of investors. Because international
official funding plays such a large role in providing
finance during such crises, to avoid moral hazard,
there is a clear need for international and/or source
country regulation that will discourage excessive
short-term capital inflows. If such international
and/or source country regulation is not developed,
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international private investors and creditors will
continue to assume excessive risks, in the knowl-
edge that they will be bailed out if the situation
becomes critical. This is the classical moral hazard
problem.
As a consequence, it is important to complete and
improve international prudential supervision and
regulation, to adapt it to the new scale and nature of
private flows. Indeed, it is essential to fill existing
regulatory gaps. Calls for improved supervision and
regulation of capital flows to emerging markets
internationally and/or by source countries began to
be heard after the Asian crisis. For example Martin
Wolf (1998) wrote in the Financial Times 'After the
crisis, the question can no longer be whether these
flows should be regulated in some way It can only
be how' In the same spirit, the G-24 in their April
1998 statement called for the creation of a task force
that, amongst other aspects, would examine: 'more
effective surveillance of the policies of major indus-
trialised countries affecting key international mone-
tary and financial variables, including capital flows.'
Soros (1997) has argued forcefully that interna-
tional capital and credit flows need to be regulated.
There are two types of flows to emerging markets
where additional regulation and supervision seems
particularly necessary as they seem insufficiently
regulated and their surges, as well as outflows, have
played a particularly prominent role in sparking off
recent currency crises. One of these flows is short-
term bank loans; the other is easily reversible
portfolio flows.
As regards short-term bank loans, they played a
particularly important role before and during the
Asian currency crises, especially in some countries,
such as South Korea. In principle, bank loans
(including short-term ones) are already regulated
by industrial countries' central banks or their other
regulators; these national regulations are coordi-
nated by the Basle Committee. Such regulations
include requirements for provisioning against
potential future losses on lending to emerging
countries (with a particularly detailed methodology
developed in the Bank of England with its provi-
sioning matrix) and capital adequacy requirements.
However, existing regulations were not enough to
discourage excessive short-term bank lending to
several of the Asian countries.
A key reason was that until just before the crisis
most of these Asian countries (and particularly
countries like South Korea) were seen by everybody,
including regulators, as creditworthy (for evidence
see Radelet and Sachs 1998). This was caused not
just by asymmetries of information and disaster
myopia (Griffith-Jones, 1998) but also by the excel-
lent record of the East Asian countries described
above. Another, perhaps somewhat secondary but
also important reason, seems to have been current
regulatory practice.3 This implies that for non-
OECD countries (which included South Korea until
recently) loans of residual maturity of up to one
year have a weighting of only 20 per cent for capi-
tal adequacy purposes, whilst loans over one year
have a weighting of 100 per cent. This introduces a
regulatory bias that encourages short-term lending.
A narrowing of the existing differential may there-
fore be desirable.
As regards portfolio flows to emerging markets,
there is at present no regulatory framework for tak-
ing account of market or credit risks on flows orig-
inating in institutional investors, such as mutual
funds (and indeed more broadly for flows originat-
ing in non-bank institutions). This is an important
regulatory gap that needs to be filled urgently, both
to protect retail investors in developed countries
and to protect developing countries from the nega-
tive effects of excessively large and potentially
volatile portfolio flows.
The need to protect retail investors from developed
countries through regulation remains, in spite of
important efforts being made to improve informa-
tion by the regulatory authorities, especially in the
US (see d'Arista and Griffith-Jones 1998). The key
reason is that it is practically impossible to improve
sufficiently information and disclosure for retail
investors on risk/return for their investments in
emerging markets, because of the conceptual com-
plexities involved, and especially given that the
problems of asymmetric information and principal
agency are particularly large for this category of
investments (Mishkin 1996).
As regards emerging market countries, the Asian
crisis confirms what was already clearly visible in
the Mexican peso crisis. Institutional investors, like
Communication with Colin Miles, Bank of England.
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mutual funds, given the very liquid nature of their
investments, can play an important role in con-
tributing to currency crises. It seems important to
fill this regulatory gap and introduce source coun-
try regulation to protect their domestic investors
(especially the less informed retail investors), and
discourage excessive surges of portfolio flows to
emerging markets. This could perhaps best be
achieved by risk-weighted cash requirements for
institutional investors, such as mutual funds. These
cash requirements would be placed as interest-bear-
ing deposits in commercial banks. It should be
stressed that this proposal is in the mainstream of
current regulatory thinking, which sees risk-
weighting as the key element in regulation (for an
authoritative statement from the US Federal Reserve
Board, see Phillips, 1998).
Introducing a risk-weighted cash requirement for
mutual funds (and perhaps other institutional
investors) would require that standards be provided
by regulatory authorities. In the United States, these
standards would result from consultations among
the Securities and Exchange Commission with the
Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury In the UK,
the standards would result from consultations
between the Securities Investment Board, with the
Bank of England and the Treasury. Weight should
be given to the views of market analysts such as
credit rating agencies, as well as particularly to the
views of international agencies such as the IMP and
BIS, with a long expertise in assessing countries'
macroeconomic performance. This would provide
guidelines for defining macroeconomic risk and for
its measurement in determining the appropriate
level of cash reserves. Thus, cash reserves would
vary according to the macroeconomic risks of
different countries.
The guidelines for macroeconomic risk (which
would determine the cash requirements) would
take into account such variables as the ratio of a
country's current account deficit (or surplus) to
GDP, the level of its external debt to GDP, the matu-
rity structure of that debt, the fragility of the bank-
ing system, and other country risk factors. Factors
such as custody-related risks (which already greatly
concern securities regulators) could be included
where relevant. It is important that quite
sophisticated analysis is used, to avoid simplistic
criteria stigmatising countries unnecessarily and
arbitrarily. The views of the Central Bank, the
Treasury, the IMF and the BIS should be helpful in
this respect, especially given the long experience of
foreign exchange crises and their causes that the
international community has acquired.
The fact that the level of the required charge would
vary with the level of perceived 'macroeconomic
risk' would make it relatively more profitable to
invest more in countries with good fundamentals
and relatively less profitable to invest in countries
with more problematic macro or financial sector
fundamentals. If macroeconomic or financial sector
fundamentals in a particular country deteriorate,
investment in them would decline gradually, which
hopefully would force an early correction of macro-
economic policy, and, once this happened, a
resumption of flows would take place; this smooth-
ing of flows would hopefully discourage the mas-
sive and sudden reversals of flows that sparked off
the Mexican peso and Asian currency crises, mak-
ing such costly crises less likely Though the
requirement for cash reserves on mutual funds'
assets invested in emerging markets could increase
somewhat the cost of raising foreign capital for
them, this would be compensated by the benefit of
a more stable supply of funds, at a more stable cost.
Similarly, retail investors in developed countries
could get slightly lower yields, but be assured of far
lower risks and lower volatility Given the dominant
role and rapid growth of institutional investors in
the US and UK, this proposal - a risk-weighted cash
requirement capital charge on mutual funds - could
be adopted first in these two countries without cre-
ating significant competitive disadvantages.
However, once implemented in the major coun-
tries, like the US and the UK, efforts to harmonise
such measures internationally would need to be
given urgent priority for discussion at the global
level by the IOSCO, so as to prevent investments by
mutual funds being channelled through off-shore
intermediaries that did not impose these cash
requirements.
The suggested measures would follow a similar
process as adopted first by G-10 Central Banks indi-
vidually, on provisioning and capital adequacy on
bank loans, which were then coordinated for all G-
10 countries in the Basic Committee; the procedure
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would be similar, and the mechanism would be
based on the same principle as capital adequacy, but
would be clearly adapted to suit the institutional
features of mutual funds, where shareholder capital
backs 100 per cent of invested assets.
Finally, it is important to stress that additional
regulation of mutual funds should be symmetrical
with regulation of other institutions (e.g. banks)
and other potentially volatile flows (e.g. excessive
short-term bank credit). Emphasis on regulation of
institutional investors, like mutual funds, is neces-
sary because they are clearly under-regulated in
comparison with other financial institutions, princi-
pally because their growth is so recent (particularly
in relation to their increased investment in
emerging markets).
It can be concluded that though better disclosure of
risk is both difficult and very valuable, better infor-
mation and disclosure needs to be complemented
by other measures to both achieve better investor
protection and diminish potential volatility of
flows, which is particularly damaging for develop-
ing countries. A complementary measure to
improve disclosure - risk-weighted cash require-
ments - has been discussed. Naturally other pro-
posals, or variations of the present proposal, could
be considered. What is clearly important is that
meaningful measures should be taken to help sta-
bilise capital flows to emerging markets. lt is also
important to stress that, given the evolution of the
markets, past strategies, such as prohibiting invest-
ment in certain markets, are clearly no longer
appropriate. Such prescriptive rules could have
potentially negative effects on investors (who could
lose profitable opportunities) and some emerging
market economies, as their access to portfolio flows
could be curtailed either in general, or - even worse
- abruptly in times of macroeconomic difficulties.
lt would seem desirable to complement measures
for improving and completing international pru-
dential supervision for credit and capital markets
with a measure of international taxation. A measure
that deserves attention is Tobin's proposal to levy an
international uniform tax on spot transactions in
foreign exchange. This proposal, initially made by
James Tobin in 1972, has received much attention
recently, particularly given turbulence on foreign
exchange markets, both in Europe (1992) and in
the emerging markets. Kaul et al. (1996) explore
the issues in depth; Kenen (1996) shows the prac-
tical feasibility of such a tax. Tobin's proposal is for
a very low tax on all currency transactions. The aim
would be to slow down speculative, short-term cap-
ital movements (which would be more affected, as
by definition they cross borders often, and would
be taxed every time), while having only a marginal
effect on long-term flows.
This would achieve two objectives. Firstly, it would
increase the autonomy of national authorities for
monetary and macroeconomic policy, and increase
independence from the effects of international
money markets. Such an autonomy would be par-
ticularly valuable for LDCs, given that their
economies adapt less easily to external shocks and
because their thinner financial markets are more
vulnerable to the impact of external capital inflows
and outflows. The second objective (Tobin 1996) is
to make exchange rates reflect to a larger degree
long-run fundamentals relative to short-range
expectations and risk. Volatility - in particular
departures from fundamentals - would be dimin-
ished. So would the likelihood of currency crises.
This proposal is different from the others listed
above, in that it may seem more radical. However,
there is a widespread feeling, even in private sector
circles, that financial liberalisation may have pro-
ceeded too far or at least too fast, and that financial
liberalisation carried to the extreme may even risk
damaging the far more important trade liberalisa-
tion whose benefits are more universally recog-
nised. Furthermore, a new tax with potentially high
yields would be attractive to fiscally constrained
governments. Part of the proceeds could also fund
public goods like poverty alleviation and environ-
ment spending, especially in poorer countries. The
tax could be introduced on a temporary basis for a
fixed period, for example five years. This would be
consistent with the fairly widespread perception
that financial fragility and systematic risk are partic-
ularly high in the current stage of 'transition' from
regulated to freer financial markets.
It can be concluded that one or several measures
need to be taken internationally to make currency
crises in emerging markets far less likely, and there-
fore ensure the efficient operation of the market
economy in emerging markets, which should be a
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basis for sustained development. The objective of
crisis avoidance seems to require some discourage-
ment andlor regulation of excessive and potentially
unsustainable short-term inflows. Such measures
would be most effective if they are applied both by
source and recipient countries, if they avoid dis-
couraging more long-term flows, if the rules
designed are simple and clearly targeted at unsus-
tainable flows and if they are complemented by
good policies in the emerging economies.
As in medicine, so with currency crises; prevention
is far better than cure. Therefore, it seems desirable
to particularly emphasise crisis prevention mea-
sures. However, if prevention fails and major cur-
rency crises do unfortunately occur, measures need
to be in place to manage them as well as possible. It
is to this that we turn in the next section.
4 Crisis Management
The lender of last resort
The first response when a large currency crisis starts
unfolding in one or more countries is to activate
quickly a sufficiently large 'international lender of
last resort' to provide the important public good of
stability The key institution in this has been the
International Monetary Fund, both through its own
resources and its catalytic role in attracting other
resources. A number of issues arise relating to the
IMF's role as lender of last resort. The main ones
seem to be: timing, scale, conditionality and ways
to avoid moral hazard. We will discuss these briefly
The issue of timing is crucial, as currency crises
happen so quickly Though the IMF and the
international financial community have made
important efforts to develop emergency procedures
to speed up significantly the Fund's response in
moments of currency crises, the response is still not
fast enough. This implies that a currency crisis is
able to unfold for a couple of weeks, before a
financing package can be put in place. As markets
move so fast and overact so much, a great deal of
damage can occur in that period (e.g. there can be
much overshooting of the exchange rate). Also, due
to contagion the crisis can spread to other coun-
tries, adding to costs and problems.
The best solution seems to be to build on a
suggestion made in a 1994 IMF paper ('Short-term
Financing Facility') and to institute preventive
programmes; indeed, such a facility seems to have
been established for the Philippines in early 1998.
What this implies is that a request for a country's
right to borrow from the IMF could be made before
a crisis happens, for example during the time of the
Fund's Article IV health check of a country's econ-
omy The country would only draw on this facility
if a crisis occurred, but could do so immediately
when it started. This would, however, imply that
the Fund would have a 'shadow programme' with
the country, and therefore impose some policy con-
ditionality, focussing on conditions that would
make a currency crisis less likely The Fund's condi-
tionality would naturally be less tough than in the
middle of a crisis, as far less draconian measures
would be required.
The country would have to accept conditionality
even while it was not receiving disbursements;
however, the country would have the very impor-
tant advantage of an automatic right to draw off a
large credit (or at least a first tranche) immediately
when a crisis started; naturally, the drawing of the
credit would be accompanied by an immediate
report to the Fund's board, but no need for board
approval. This procedure would have the great
advantage for the country (and the international
community) that the immediate activation of the
facility would reassure the markets more quickly,
thus hopefully reducing the scale of the crisis and
its cost.
A second crucial issue is the scale of the lending, by
the IMF and others. Bagehot's (1873) classic advice
on national lenders of last resort was that, to be
effective in convincing markets, such a facility must
be able to 'lend freely', that is virtually open-ended.
The massive scale for an international lender of last
resort, given the scale of assets in the private mar-
kets, poses a serious challenge for governments and
central banks of the major countries. This challenge
is made more difficult by the resistance of the liS
Congress to providing additional resources to the
IMF which are clearly necessary
An additional serious problem, that has been
insufficiently discussed, is that when such large vol-
umes of IMF - as well as World Bank and Regional
Development Bank - funding is channelled towards
middle-income countries in crisis, funding available
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from those institutions for low-income countries
can fall drastically This is a very negative indirect
effect of currency crises.
Two types of measures can help alleviate the
pressure on the IMF and governments as interna-
tional lender of last resort. The first is to reduce the
likelihood of currency crises, by giving high prior-
ity to adopting measures along the lines discussed
in section 3 above. The second measure to reduce
the need for international public funding is to
attempt to involve the private sector in providing
some of the liquidity required for the lender of last
resort facility lt is interesting that some countries
(e.g. Argentina) have recently already themselves
arranged stand-by facilities with international
banks, only to be used in case of a currency crisis.
This facility, however, has not yet been tested.
A final issue is the nature of IMF conditionality that
should accompany the large financial packages,
linked to currency crises. There have been a num-
ber of criticisms of IMF conditionality For example,
Feldstein (1998) has argued that IMF conditionality
has been too intrusive and too comprehensive, try-
ing to make dramatic changes in very short periods.
Radelet and Sachs (1998) have further argued that
the conditionality has not been appropriate in sev-
eral important aspects, (e.g. bank closures, tighten-
ing of fiscal policy, excessive emphasis on full debt
repayment) and even that some of these measures
and their pace have 'added to, rather than amelio-
rated, the panic'. Their critique seems particularly
strong on the abrupt shutting down of financial
institutions without a more comprehensive pro-
gramme for financial sector reform and no deposit
insurance in place, which in Thailand and
Indonesia only deepened the panic.
On macroeconomic policy, the key new challenge
for IMP (and country) programmes is to design
appropriate macroeconomic responses for currency
crises that mainly originate in private sector imbal-
ances and not, as IMP packages are accustomed to
dealing with, public sector imbalances. The tradi-
tional IMP response - tightening fiscal policy .- may
either be totally inappropriate or insufficient. New
elements need to be introduced, in the new context
of private sector led deficits, like counter-cyclic
macroeconomic policy; greater focus has to be
placed not just on post-crisis macro-management,
but on prudent fiscal and monetary management
during periods of abundant capital inflows. This
could, for example, even include cyclically adjusted
taxation to curb excessive growth of private spend-
ing. Domestic prudential regulation of the financial
sector could also include anti-cyclical elements
such as stricter prudential regulation of short-term
foreign exposure by banks. It could also imply lim-
iting the value of assets (e.g. real estate) allowed to
be used as guarantees for loans, when the value of
such assets can fall significantly if a currency and
financial crisis occurs.
Orderly workouts
The Asian crisis has lent a sense of urgency to the
search for ways to manage financial crises more
effectively The scale of capital flows in the 1990s
means that public funds can no longer be relied
upon to offset the private outflows during a crisis.
In response to this situation, as well as to increased
concern over moral hazard issues, there is a widely
held view that a better means of burden sharing is
required, with the private sector taking some of the
responsibility for the ongoing provision of credit to
borrowers in crisis countries.
The scale of the IMF-led rescue packages in Asia,
together with that of the one put together for
Mexico during the peso crisis, have led to increased
concern over the issue of moral hazard. Moral haz-
ard occurs when the party that assesses the level of
risk of a given transaction receives the gains from,
but does not bear the full costs of, the risks taken.
Moral hazard is believed to be particularly strong on
the lender's side, as lenders and investors are saved
from having to bear the full risks of their investment
decisions by IMF-led bail-outs. The knowledge that
a bail-out would be likely should a country hit dif-
ficulties discourages investors and lenders from
adequately assessing the risk of investing in
emerging markets.
The need to reduce moral hazard, however, does
not imply that policymakers should do nothing; the
problems involved in collective action, and the risk
of contagion are justification for official intervention
in crises. The problems of collective action were
clearly illustrated during the 1980s debt crisis,
The Group of Ten, 1996, 'The Resolution of Settlements, BasTe and International Monetary Fund,
Sovereign Liquidity Crises', Bank for International Washington.
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when the long drawn-out debt negotiations were an
important factor in delaying recovery in Latin
America. A further example is that of Indonesia in
the current crisis, where it took six months for the
country to reach agreement with foreign banks on a
private-sector debt restructuring programme.
During the intervening period, January to June
1998, the Indonesian economy deteriorated to the
point where debt rescheduling may no longer be
sufficient.
There is clearly a need for a system which can bring
about the rapid resolution of crises, while limiting
the problems of moral hazard. There is now a grow-
ing consensus that ways need to found to encourage
a greater assumption of risk by the private sector, as
well as to involve the private sector at an early stage
in crisis resolution in order to achieve equitable
burden sharing vis-a-vis the official sector. In a
short-term liquidity crisis, as many now believe the
Asian crisis to have been, at least at the outset, the
timely provision of significant further credit could
avoid the imposition of damaging austerity mea-
sures on affected economies. In such cases, the offi-
cial sector, rather than bailing out private creditors,
could bail them in by enforcing early debt negotia-
tions. The private creditors could be encouraged to
retain their exposure, and to restructure their short-
term credits over a longer term, as a condition of
official assistance. In cases of insolvency, the official
sector could play a vital role in coordinating the
debt workout, including compelling private credi-
tors to write off debt where necessary
In response to the Asian crisis, a G-22 working
group has been set up to look at these issues under
the heading of 'Appropriate Burden-sharing in
International Financial Crises'. The working group
will build on work undertaken by the G-10 on sov-
ereign liquidity crises in the wake of the Mexican
peso crisis, which examined the need to introduce
new mechanisms to encourage a more efficient mar-
ket-based resolution of debt crises.4 The proposals
being reviewed by the G-22 include: (i) changes in
the provisions of loan contracts and bond covenants
to facilitate restructuring; (ii) the use of a unilateral
stay on payments; and (iii) the potential for lending
into arrears by the IMP
The working group will look at proposals to include
contractual provisions in bond contracts and loan
agreements which could help to facilitate creditor
decision-making and therefore the orderly resolu-
tion of crises. Such provisions could encourage dia-
logue between debtors and creditors, as well as
among creditors, and prevent a minority of dissi-
dent investors from holding up settlement. Among
such provisions are those that (a) provide for the
collective representation of debt holders in the
event of a crisis, (b) allow for qualified majority vot-
ing to alter the terms and conditions of contracts,
and (c) require the sharing among creditors of
assets received from the debtor.
The G-22 working group is also examining
alternative ways of achieving standstill-type
arrangements, including the use of official sanctions
for enforcing standstills. The G-10 report recog-
nised that, in exceptional circumstances, temporary
payment suspensions may be a necessary part of the
crisis resolution process. The threat of a payment
suspension would encourage creditors to seek rapid
debt renegotiation. If governments impose a stand-
still as part of a process of cooperative and non-con-
frontational debt renegotiation, creditors are
unlikely to penalise them. The effectiveness of such
an arrangement could be enhanced if the interna-
tional financial institutions were to signal their
approval by lending into arrears to countries whose
policies and prospects are considered acceptable.
Objections to both informal and formal signalling
methods are centred on moral hazard and conta-
gion arguments. Moral hazard for borrowing coun-
tries would be limited by the painful experience of
crises, and by the strict conditionality that the IMF
would impose on lending in such circumstances.
Furthermore, the possibility of a suspension of pay-
ments would reduce the moral hazard that encour-
ages lenders to lend too much in the expectation
that they will be bailed out by the IMF should
things go wrong. The issue of contagion, however,
is a more complex one as there are still large gaps in
our understanding of how contagion works. Some
argue that if markets get wind of a payments sus-
pension in one emerging market economy, they
may well pull out of other markets perceived to be
'similar' in some way. \Vhile this argument is feasi-
ble, the mechanisms currently in place have failed
to limit contagion during the Asian crisis. Another
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question is whether the accepted use of payments
suspensions during crises would raise the cost of
capital to emerging markets generally
The search for more effective ways to manage
financial crises remains a priority as, although pre-
vention is undoubtedly better than cure, crises will
never be eliminated altogether. The orderly debt
workout proposals discussed above offer possible
ways to improve the existing mechanisms for deal-
ing with crises, while minimising moral hazard and
therefore reducing the likelihood of crises occurring
in the first place. The current standard crisis
response, which concentrates on imposing tough
stabilisation measures on debtors, has had a partic-
ularly debilitating effect on the Asian countries
affected by the present crisis, while the lengthy
negotiations to agree debt restructuring in
Indonesia provide a potent example of the failings
of current arrangements. Valuable time was wasted,
and crises which may well have been short-term
liquidity crises at the outset became full-blown eco-
nomic and financial crises, with serious social and
political consequences for countries of the region.
5 Conclusions
The international community has been reflecting on
lessons emerging from the Asian crisis and what
steps need to be taken to improve crisis prevention
and crisis management in the new globalised econ-
omy
Section 3 of this article examined the key proposals
being put forward by the IMF: improving the avail-
ability and transparency of information regarding
economic data and policies to both the fund and the
public, together with strengthening IMF surveil-
lance; strengthening domestic financial systems, by
improving regulation and supervision; and encour-
aging the orderly and properly sequenced liberali-
sation of capital flows. lt was shown that, while
these proposals represent necessary steps toward
establishing a stronger international financial sys-
tem, they would not be sufficient to prevent future
crises. Key problems areas, such as the irrational
behaviour of market participants and the difficulties
of implementing financial sector reform in emerg-
ing market countries, represent major obstacles.
Furthermore, while more prudent capital account
liberalisation in emerging market countries would
undoubtedly be welcome, many now believe that
these sometimes fragile economies need to be pro-
tected from the full force of international finance.
This could be done by one or several measures that
better regulate or tax short-term capital flows,
nationally andlor internationally
At a national level, there seems to be growing
consensus that market-based measures to discour-
age excessive surges of short-term capital flows are
desirable, as part of a package of measures of good
management of capital flows, which clearly
includes prudent monetary and fiscal policies, as
well as a well supervised domestic financial system.
The Chilean system of non-remunerated reserve
requirements on inflows up to one year seems to
work particularly well, even though they have some
microeconomic costs.
Internationally, prudential regulation of short-term
capital flows also may need to be improved and
completed where gaps exist. In this context, two
types of capital flows seem particularly relevant.
One is short-term bank loans, whose regulation
may need to be modified, as the current system pro-
vides strong regulatory incentives towards more
short-term loans and less for long-term loans.
Portfolio flows are at present totally unregulated by
source countries, if they originated in non-bank
institutions, like institutional investors.
Risk-weighted cash requirements for mutual funds
in source countries - varying with macroeconomic
evolution in developing countries - may be an
appropriate way to smooth such flows, which will
be beneficial for developing countries. An alterna-
tive mechanism - that would achieve a similar
objective - is the creation of a guarantee institution,
that for a fee would guarantee flows to emerging
markets, up to a limit. Another idea worth consid-
ering is that of a very small international tax on all
foreign exchange transactions (known as the Tobin
tax - see above), that would also help discourage
short-term flows without having any major effect on
desirable long-term flows.
Though top priority needs to be given to crisis pre-
vention, measures also need to be put in place to
improve crisis management. These are explored in
section 4. They include improving existing
mechanisms - led by the IMF - for a lender of last
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resort. Improvements relate firstly to the necessary
speed of such lending, given the incredible speed
with which markets move; approval of shadow pro-
grammes before a crisis occurs, with loans activated
as soon as one breaks out, may be an attractive
option. The scale of existing facilities and IMF
resources needs to be enlarged, given the large scale
of private funds flowing through international mar-
kets. To enhance the scale of official facilities, the
prospect of co-financing with the private sector, and
particularly with private banks, needs to be
explored. Finally, the issue of appropriate condi-
tionality attached to financial packages needs to be
revised, so that the conditionality is best targeted to
restoring market confidence, with minimum
damage to growth in the countries.
Also, there is now a general consensus among the
international community that new ways need to be
found to involve the private sector in crisis resolu-
tion in order to achieve equitable burden sharing
with regard to the official sector, limit the problems
of moral hazard and reduce the size of official
financing required. Section 4 of this chapter out-
lined some of the proposals for orderly debt work-
outs currently being reviewed: the establishment of
international bankruptcy procedures; changes in
the provisions of loan contracts and bond
covenants; and IMF-supported debt moratoria.
Examination of the possible benefits and shortcom-
ings of these proposals suggests that, despite the
objections raised, international dialogue on these
issues needs to be stepped up.
The policy debate in these areas needs to lead
urgently to new policy measures and mechanisms,
so as to avoid costly currency crises happening
again and to manage them better if unfortunately
they do happen. Given the complexity of the issues
involved, the policy debate and actions needs to be
underpinned by improved knowledge.
Further work is required to understand better than
we currently do:
(a) How international capital and credit markets
work. This will include for example, better
understanding of how decisions are made by dif-
ferent categories of bankers, fund managers and
other actors to enter and leave countries. What
explains domestic investors behaviour? Are
some foreign investors/lenders more volatile
than others? What determines whether conta-
gion from one country to others occurs? What
explains the path of contagion?
(b)What policy mechanisms could best be
deployed nationally and internationally to pre-
vent currency crises in developing countries?
This would include more detailed study of the
measures outlined above, but could also include
others, like self-regulatory mechanisms within
the financial industry and changes to the in
centive systems of fund managers. The costs and
benefits of different mechanisms need to be care-
fully assessed, together with the complex issues
of implementation.
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